

## Message Text

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TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 007253

NODIS

CHEROKEE ONLY FOR DR BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 0212 ACTION STATE JAN 10.

QUOTE S E C R E T ANKARA 0212

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY, NIMETZ, AND VEST ONLY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, TU

SUBJECT: US-TURKISH RELATIONS

REF: ANKARA 0195

1. I WAS CALLED TO MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT AT FIVE O'CLOCK JAN 10 FOR A "FIFTEEN MENUTE" SESSION THAT TURNED INTO A FIFTY MINUTE MEETING DURING WHICH ECEVIT DID MOST OF THE TALKING. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER OKCUN AND TULUMEN FOR THE FOREIGN OFFICE. DCM DILLON ACCOMPANIED ME.

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2. I BEGAN BY TELLING THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WASHINGTON WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME ANY INFORMATION THAT HE COULD GIVE ME ABOUT HIS TALKS WITH SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM AND WHATEVER HE COULD COMMUNICATE ON HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD BOTH US-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, ON WHICH HE HAD MADE A NUMBER OF RECENT

STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS. I TOLD HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY VANCE, CLARK CLIFFORD AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON ARE DETERMINED TO RESTORE A STRONG US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP. BOTH VANCE AND CLIFFORD ASKED ME TO CONVEY THEIR HIGHEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND THEIR HOPE THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH TURKEY'S PRESSING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

3. WASHINGTON HAD NOTED HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY ATTENTION AND THAT A SETTLEMENT IS IN TURKEY'S INTEREST, COMPLETELY ASIDE FROM THE US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP. THE US WELCOMES THIS, AS WE HAVE NO INHERENT REASON, BEYOND IMPROVING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, TO SEEK AN ACTIVE US ROLE OR INVOLVEMENT. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT TO US AS WE WORK TOWARD THE REBUILDING OF A STRONG BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS MOVING TOWARD RESOLUTION.

4. I RECALLED THAT OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS WE HAD MOST USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS STAFF. WE, FOR OUR PART, WERE PREPARED TO CONFIRM THE CONTENT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS.

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5. I NOTED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE OTHER IDEAS ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS, AND WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME HIS THOUGHTS. IF HE FELT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THESE MATTERS, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO ARRANGE A VISIT TO ANKARA OR SOME OTHER CONVENIENT LOCATION OF A HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL FROM WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE GAMUT OF US-TURKISH RELATIONS AND HOW WE COULD BEST PROCEED TOGETHER TOWARD OUR COMMON GOALS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED ME FOR THE MESSAGE AND ALSO FOR THE MESSAGE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SENT SO QUICKLY ON HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP. HE WISHED TO EXPLAIN THAT HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WAS NOT A SIGN OF ANY HARD FEELINGS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. HE UNDERSTOOD THE US WAS A GLOBAL POWER AND HAD INTERESTS IN THE AREA. TURKEY WANTED TO SETTLE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE ITS OWN INTERESTS DICTATED THIS. IF THE TURKISH-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND CYPRUS

WERE TIED TOGETHER IT WOULD ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH BOTH ISSUES. HE WISHED TO SETTLE THE CYPRUS ISSUE REGARDLESS OF THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE PROBLEM OF LINKAGE WAS IN THE CONGRESS, BUT IT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL TO HIM IF THE ADMINISTRATION MADE ANY STATEMENTS IMPLYING THAT IT ENDORSED ANY SUCH LINKAGE. HE INTENDED TO MAKE "CERTAIN MOVES" ON CYPRUS. IF THE US MIGHT WISH TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THIS COULD BE USEFUL.

7. ECEVIT IMPLIED THAT LINKAGE GAVE GREECE LEVERAGE; HE ASSERTED GREECE WOULD TRY TO EXPLOIT PUBLIC OPINION AND TO THE EXTENT THAT IT COULD DO SO SUCCESSFULLY ITS POSITIONS  
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WOULD BE MORE RIGID. HE RECALLED THE COMING TOGETHER OF ATATURK AND VENIZELOS IN THE 1920'S AND MENDERES AND CARA-MANLIS' ABILITY TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS IN THE 50'S AS EXAMPLES OF THE ABILITY OF THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS TO GET TOGETHER FACE-TO-FACE WHEN THE GREAT POWERS WERE "OCCUPIED ELSEWHERE". THESE EXAMPLES WERE VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. ECEVIT SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY ELEKDAG ON THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND TURKEY SINCE SEPTEMBER, BUT HE WANTED ME TO DESCRIBE MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT.

9. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT AT ALL SESSIONS BUT THAT WHEN WE MET IN ANKARA IN SEPTEMBER WE MADE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES GAVE GREAT PRIORITY TO THE RESTORATION OF OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, OF WHICH THE DCA HAD BECOME THE PARAMOUNT SYMBOL. ALTHOUGH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DID NOT LINK CYPRUS AND THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP (ECEVIT RECALLED THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IN LONDON IN MAY TO THIS EFFECT), THE PRACTICAL SITUATION WAS THAT THEY HAD BEEN LINKED BY THE CONGRESS. IN SEPTEMBER AND SUBSEQUENTLY, WE EXPLORED IN DEPTH WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WHAT IT WOULD FIND POLITICALLY POSSIBLE TO DO TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR PASSAGE OF THE DCA AND TO GIVE A SENSE OF HOPE AND OPTIMISM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CYPRUS SOLUTION. I RECALLED SOME OF THE STEPS THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT FELT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO TAKE (TROOP WITHDRAWALS, ETC). THE GOT HAD ALSO ASKED US TO USE OUR BEST OFFICES WITH THE GREEKS TO GET THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN A QUADRIPARTITE FRAMEWORK. WE HAD AGREED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION,  
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AS SOON AS FEASIBLE, WOULD MOVE FORWARD WITH THE DCA.  
I COULD REAFFIRM THAT IT IS THE US'S  
INTENTION TO MOVE AHEAD AS SOON AS WE BELIEVED THE  
AGREEMENT COULD BE PASSED.

ECEVIT INTERJECTED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THERE  
WAS A PROBLEM ABOUT SETTING A DATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL  
HEARINGS.(

10. I SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF  
SETTING DATES FOR HEARINGS AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN RAISED  
BY CAGLAYANGIL WITH THE SECRETARY IN BRUSSELS IN  
DECEMBER. THE SECRETARY HAD NO BEEN ABLE TO GIVE A  
DATE BUT IN ANY EVENT, I THOUGHT THAT THE OPERATIONAL  
ISSUE WAS THE TIMING OF A PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WAS  
ASKING THE CONGRESS TO PROCEED. I SUPPOSED THAT THE  
IDEA OF HEARINGS DURING THE CONGRESSIONAL RECESS HAD  
BEEN RULED OUT; BRING THE CONGRESS  
BACK FROM VACATION IN DECEMBER WOULD HAVE BEEN  
COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. IN THE MEANTIME, IT HAD ALSO  
BECOME APPARENT THAT A NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE  
FORMED IN ANKARA AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO  
SURVEY THE PROBLEM WITH THIS GOVERNMENT BEFORE MOVING  
AHEAD. I SAID THAT WHAT THE PRIME  
MINISTER WAS TELLING ME WOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO THE  
ADMINISTRATION IN ASSESSING HOW TO PROCEED NOW. I AGREED  
THAT THE EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH THE  
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN IN TERMS OF A MARCH-APRIL  
FRAMEWORK FOR PASSAGE OF THE DCA. WITH A NEW GOVERN-  
MENT NOW IN OFFICE, WE NEEDED TO KNOW WHETHER THE ARRANGEMENTS  
WITH ITS PREDECESSOR WERE STILL RELEVANT.

11. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE "MUST EXPRESS  
ONE DOUBT." APPARENTLY THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN IN  
PROCEEDING WITH THE DCA IS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE  
GREEK LOBBY. HE THOUGHT THAT THE LIKELIHOOD

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WOULD BE FOR THE GREEKS TO STAY RIGID IF THEY FELT  
THAT BY SO DOING THAT THEY COULD PREVENT THE PASSAGE  
OF THE DCA. HE NOTED THAT EVEN THOUGH HE HAD MADE  
MORE "CONCRETE STATEMENTS" ON CYPRUS HAN CAGLAYANGIL  
HAD, SO FAR THE GREEKS HAD RESPONDED IN A STRONG  
NEGATIVE WAY. HE WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME ANY  
HELP THE UNITED STATES COULD PROVIDE TO ENCOURAGE

ATHENS TO A DIALOGUE WITH TURKEY. HE NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT ONE OF THE REASONS HE HAD TALKED ABOUT THE NON-INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES IN THE CYPRUS ISSUE WAS TO HELP DEAL WITH SOVIET DESIRES TO PARTICIPATE IN TALKS ON CYPRUS.

12. WITH RESPECT TO THE DCA, ECEVIT SAID THAT HE HAD NOT STUDIED IT IN DETAIL. HE WOULD ASK THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEFENSE MINISTER TO REVIEW THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY, BUT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, HE WANTED TO RESUME MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

13. IN THIS CONNECTION HE SAID TURKEY'S DEFENSE CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE GLOBAL PROBLEM OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE NEEDED TO KNOW WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN HIS AREA SINCE THE DCA WAS SIGNED. HE DID NOT FEEL WELL-INFORMED ABOUT THE BASIC APPROACH OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND FELT THAT TURKEY, AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE ALLIANCE, MUST HAVE BROADER INFORMATION ON THE US PERSPECTIVE. ACCORDINGLY, HE WOULD WELCOME A SHORT VISIT FROM AN AUTHORITATIVE MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATION. IT SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE ANYONE BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DEFENSE OR BRZEZINSKI. HE FELT THAT A BRZEZINSKI  
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VISIT WOULD BE EASIER TO HANDLE SINCE HE HAD INVITED HIM TO ANKARA AFTER THE BILDERBERG CONFERENCE TWO YEARS AGO. SINCE BRZEZINSKI IS A SOVIETOLOGIST WITH A BROAD VIEW OF US OBJECTIVES, A VISIT BY HIM WOULD BE PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE, WHEREAS A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE WELCOME, WOULD HAVE MORE OF AN OFFICIAL CAST.

14. ECEVIT THEN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO TELL ME ABOUT HIS TALKS WITH WALDHEIM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL, HE SAID, WANTED A TURKISH "GREEN LIGHT" FOR RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE HAD NOTED THE UNUSUAL CHARACTER OF THE UNSYG'S DEEP INVOLVEMENT IN THIS ISSUE AND FELT THEREFORE THAT THE TALKS MUST BE SUCCESSFUL.

15. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD RESIGNED AS PRIME MINISTER IN 1974 PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE PROBLEMS WITH HIS COALITION PARTNER (ERBAKAN) PREVENTED MOVEMENT ON CYPRUS. THERE ARE, HE SAID, NOW NO COALITION PROBLEMS. ALL, INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENTS, ARE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NEED FOR POSITIVE MOVEMENT ON CYPRUS TOWARD A

BONAFIDE SOLUTION. AS SOON AS THE CONFIDENCE VOTE HAS TAKEN PLACE, HE SAID, HE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO ENCOURAGE THE TFSC TO GO BACK TO INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

16. HE FELT THAT THE TURKISH SIDE SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON THE TERRITORIAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, INCLUDING PRESENTATION OF A MAP. HOWEVER, IN A NEGOTIATING SESSION, THE GREEKS SHOULD NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH. HE SAID THERE WERE LIMITS TO THE POLITICAL RISKS HE COULD TAKE, ALTHOUGH HE IS PREPARED TO CAST MANY OF THESE ASIDE. THERE ARE ALSO RISKS OF STIMULATING FURTHER STRIFE ON THE ISLAND. SINCE 1974 THE SITUATION HAS BECOME MORE SETTLED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE AND TOO MUCH CHANGE CANNOT BE EXPECTED. HOWEVER, THE  
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TERRITORIAL ISSUE IS NEGOTIABLE "WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS", AND TURKEY IS PREPARED TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE ON THIS ELEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

17. COMMENTING ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD RESTUDY THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE TURKISH SIDE. HE FELT THAT THE EARLIER PROPOSALS WOULD NOT ENCOURAGE THE EMERGENCE OF A TRUE FEDERATION, AND HE INSISTED THAT FEDERATION, NOT CONFEDERATION, WAS HIS OBJECTIVE. HE DID NOT WANT AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO A SPLIT ON THE ISLAND, WITH TWO STATES JOINING THEIR MOTHER COUNTRIES SINCE THIS WOULD INJECT GREEK POWER FURTHER INTO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, HOWEVER, THE ARRANGEMENTS MUST GIVE THE TURKISH COMMUNITY SUFFICIENT AUTONOMY TO INSURE ITS SECURITY. TURKEY WAS PREPARED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA AS WELL.

18. ECEVIT SAID THAT THESE TURKISH MOVES WOULD NOT BE HELD UP TO AWAIT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. IF THE CONGRESS MOVES ON THE DCA, SO MUCH THE BETTER. THIS WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

19. ECEVIT ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD WALDHEIM, AS HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THAT CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN ARE SEPARATE ISSUES, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO WORK ON THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY SINCE PROGRESS ON EITHER WOULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS ON THE OTHER.

20. ECEVIT SAID THAT WALDHEIM HAD ASKED IF HE WISHED HIM TO TRY TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH CARAMANLIS.  
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HE HAD ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY AND WALDHEIM SAID HE WOULD PROPOSE IT IN ATHENS. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF WALDHEIM APPRECIATED THAT THIS COULD BE EMBARRASSING FOR CARAMANLIS, WHO APPARENTLY DID NOT WANT USCH A MEETING. SINCE 1974 THE GREEKS HAD AVOIDED A DIALOGUE AT A HIGH LEVEL, HREFERING DISCUSSION AMONG TECHNICIANS. HOWEVER, SAID ECEVIT, TECHNICIANS NEED POLITICAL DIRECTIVES. HE FELT THAT THE GREEK BUREAUCRACY WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO PREVENT A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN HIM AND CARAMANLIS. THIS MIGHT BE AN EXAMPLE OF THE WELL-KNOWN PHONOMENON OF DEFORMATION PRO-FESSIONELLE, A DESIRE TO KEEP THE REINS IN ITS OWN HANDS.

21. ECEVIT SAID HE KNEW THERE WERE DANOERS IN HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUES. HE RUEFULLY NOTED THAT SADAT MAY COME TO REGRET HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT THINK EVERYTHING HAD TO BE AGREED ON AT SUCH A MEETING AND HE WAS PREPARED TO SO STATE IN ADVANCE IN ORDER TO AVOID EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS. HOWEVER, HE FELT IT WAS NATURAL FOR NEIGHBORING PRIME MINISTERS TO MEET AND DISCUSS COMMON PROBLEMS AND PERHAPS DRAFT A POLITICAL DIRECTIVE WHICH WOULD GOVERN THE WORK OF TECHNICIANS.

2. AS REGARDS THE AEOEAN, HE FELT THAT THE GREEKS HAD EXPLOITED THE POSITION THEY HAD ENJOYED IN A CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR ROLE IN NATO TO ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AIR AND THE SEA BEDS. TURKEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE EXCLUSION WHICH WAS IMPLICIT IN THE GREEK POSITION. HE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HELP THE US COULD GIVE IN ENCOURAGING THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO TAKE THE TURKISH REQUIREMENTS IN THIS AREA MORESERIOUSLY. HE RECALLED THE SUPPORT THAT KISSINGER HAD GIVEN TURKEY IN 1976 DURING THE SISMIT DISPUTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

23. ECEVIT SAID THAT HE HAD REMINDED WALDHEIM THAT  
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IN JULY 1974, AT THE FIRST GENEVA MEETING, A DOCUMENT HAD BEEN AGREED RECOGNIZING THE EXISTENCE OF TWO SEPARATE AND AUTONOMOUS ADMINSTRATIONS IN CYRPUS. HE HAD THOUGHT THIS MATTER HAD BEEN SETTLED BUT NOW HIS RECENT STATMENTS CLLING, INTER ALIA, FOR A "BIZONAL STATE" WERE BEING CRITICIZED IN THE GREEK PRESS.

24. I SAID THAT THE REPORT ON THIS DISCUSSION AND THE INSIGHTS IT PROVIDED ON HIS APPROACH TOWARD THE CYRPUS PROBLEM AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS WOULD BE VERY MUCH WELCOMED IN WASHINGTON. HIS VIEWS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CLARIFYING THE ADMINSTRATIONS VIEWS ON THE APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS REQUEST FOR A VISIT BY BRZEZINSKI AND I WAS SURE THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE THAT ANY SUCH VISIT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE BALANCED BY A COMPARABLE VISIT TO ATHENS. I EXPRESSED MY PERSONAL VIEW, IN RESPONSE TO HIS ANXIETIES ABOUT THE "POWER OF THE GREEK LOBBY," THAT IF THE TURKISH POSITION WAS FORTHCOMING AND REASONABLE, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT PROGRESS WAS PREVENTED BY THE OTHER PARTIES, THE RESTORATION OF OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT BE BLOCKED.

25. ECEVIT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WISHED TO HAVE THE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND WITH ME PERSONALLY AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE ME AT ANY TIME FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. HE PROMISED TO KEEP ME FULLY INFORMED AS THE TURKISH POSITION EVOLVED IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

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26. COMMENT: IT BECAME CLEAR AFTER SENDING REFTEL THAT ELEKDAG'S SUGGESTION THAT I ASK FOR A MEETING WAS STIMULATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF, WHO PRESUMABLY DID NOT WISH TO CALL ME IN WITHOUT MY HAVING ASKED FOR

A MEETING. THIS WAS MY FIRST NON-SOCIAL CONTACT WITH THE PRIME MINSITER. HE SPOKE RAPIDLY, AND I WAS IMPRESSED BY HIS ARTICULATENESS, COMMAND OF THE SITUATION, AND THE IMPRESSION HE CONVEYED OF KNOWING JUST WHERE HE WANTED TO GO. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE IS GOING TO BE HIS OWN FOREIGN MINISTER. OKCUN SAT SILENT THROUGHOUT THE SESSION. MUCH OF WHAT ECEVIT SAID HAD BEEN FORESHADOWED IN THE PRESS OVER THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS. IN THIS TALK, HOWEVER, HE CARRIED HIS POSITION FURTHER. MOST IMPORTANT, I FELT, WAS HIS AFFIRMATION OF WILLINGNESS TO PRESENT A TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL, ALTHOUGHT HIS REMARKS IMPLIED LESS FLEXIBILITY THAN CAGLAYNAGIL'S ASSURANCE THAT TURKEY WOULD BE "GENEROUS" IN ITS APPROACH ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE. ON CONSTITUTION



HE CONVEYED A SENSE OF MUCH GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND WAS IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF THE NEGATIVENESS OF TURKEY'S PREVIOUS POSITION. ON THE DCA I FELT HE WAS REFLECTING A NEW ADMINISTRATION'S NATURAL DESIRE TO "STUDY" THE FILES BEFORE COMMITTING HIMSELF TO A SPECIFIC DOCUMENT. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE WILL BE TOLD THAT THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO APPROVE THE DCA.

MY VIEW AT THIS POINT IS THAT ECEVIT'S APPROACH OPENS REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR BREAKING THE CYPRUS LOGJAM AND FOR HELPING US WITH THE CONGRESS. HIS INTEREST IN STARTING MOMENTUM GOING TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT STRIKINGLY COINCIDES WITH OUR OWN, AND  
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I THINK THERE ARE CLEAR ADVANTAGES TO FINDING WAYS OF ADAPTING TO AND ENCOURAGING HIS INITIATIVE.

WITH RESPECT TO HIS BID FOR A BRZEZINSKI VISIT, I WOULD STRONGLY URGE THAT IF THE SECRETARY CANNOT FIND A WAY TO FIT IN A STOP HERE (AND PRESUMABLY IN ATHENS) DURING HIS FORTHCOMING MIDDLE EAST TRIP, WE RESPOND FAVORABLY. ECEVIT SERIOUSLY WANTS A DISCUSSION WITH A FIGURE AT THE CENTER OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ON WHERE WE ARE GOING IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW THIS IMPACTS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, PARTICULARLY IN THE DEFENSE FIELD. HE IS INTERESTED IN SOMETHING BROADER THAN A DISCUSSION OF US-TURKISH RELATIONS OR THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. SPEIRS UNQUOTE VANCE

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## Message Attributes

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